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QUALIFYING IMMUNITY: PROTECTING STATE
EMPLOYEES' RIGHT TO PROTECT THEIR
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS AFTER ALDEN '. MAINE
Raymond J. Farrow
Abstract: Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have barred state employees from
bringing private suits against their state employers to recover back wages due them as a
result of having been paid in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). This
Comment proposes that the only method by which state employees may protect their FLSA
rights on their own behalf is to bring suits against responsible state supervisory personnel in
their individual capacities. Although such actions are not barred by sovereign immunity, the
potential ability of state agents to invoke a defense of "qualified immunity" would severely
impair state employees' ability to protect their FLSA rights. This Comment therefore argues
that there is no basis either in the language of the FLSA or at common law for applying the
doctrine of qualified immunity to state officers liable for violations of the FLSA.

In December of 1993, John Alden and ninety-five current and former
state probation officers sued the state of Maine' seeking to enforce their
right under the Fair Labor Standards Act 2 (FLSA) to receive time-andone-half pay for overtime hours worked. The district court determined
that Maine had failed to pay the officers appropriate overtime
compensation 3 and in a subsequent decision ordered the computation of
damages due each officer in the form of two years of backpay.4 Five
years later, after an odyssey through the federal and state court systems,
John Alden and his fellow officers found themselves unable to collect
the sums awarded them under the FLSA. The U.S. Supreme Court
determined that no court in the land had the power to force Maine to
defend itself against Alden's attempt to enforce his statutory rights.5 A
1. Mills v. Maine, 839 F. Supp. 3,4 (D. Me. 1993) affid 118 F.3d 37,41 (st Cir. 1997). The
original named plaintiff Jon Mills was later replaced as the named plaintiff by John Alden. To
avoid confusion, this Comment refers to Alden as the named plaintiff. See Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d
37, 41 (Ist
Cir. 1997) (explaining that ninety-six officers were included in original suit).
2.Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1994)). The FLSA governs child labor laws, minimum wage laws, and overtime pay requirements.
See id.
3. Mills, 839 F. Supp. at 6.
4. Mills v. Maine, 853 F. Supp. 551,556 (D. Me. 1994) aff'd 118 F.3d 37,41 (st Cir. 1997).
5. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,712 (1999) (immunizing state from FLSA suit brought by
state employees in state court); Seminole Tribe v. Florida 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (immunizing
state from suit in federal court brought by individuals based on statutes enacted under Congress's
Commerce Clause powers).
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controversial 6 pair of U.S. Supreme Court decisions7 regarding the scope

of state sovereign immunity from suit had denied Congress the ability to
subject states to private suit for violating federal laws enacted pursuant
to Congress's Commerce Clause powers. As a result, the state of Maine
would forever be able to keep the thousands of dollars in wages that had
been wrongfully withheld from Alden and his colleagues.8
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's dramatic re-interpretation of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in the 1990s, state employees such as
Alden may have the ability to protect their right to recover back wages
due to them, as specified by the FLSA.9 The FLSA provides an
expansive definition as to who may be considered liable for a violation
of the FLSA, specifically allowing complaining parties to seek relief
from "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer."' The FLSA thereby provides a cause of action allowing
state employees to sue appropriate state supervisory personnel
responsible for allegedly violative employment practices." While
sovereign immunity does not protect individual state agents sued in their
individual capacities, 2 the doctrine of qualified immunity is available to
government officials sued for violating a plaintiff's constitutional rights

6. In Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), Justice Stevens harshly criticized one of
the Court's recent sovereign immunity cases:
I remain convinced that... the decision of five Justices in Seminole Tribe ...was profoundly
misguided. Despite my respect for stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept Seminole Tribe as
controlling precedent ....[T]he reasoning of that opinion is so profoundly mistaken ...that it

has forsaken any claim to the usual deference or respect owed to decisions of this Court.
Id. at 97-98 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
7. Alden, 527 U.S. at 754 (holding that Congress lacks power to subject states to private suit in
state court when legislating under its Article I powers); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73 (same
result in federal court).
8. The exact amount owed had not been determined when the Seminole Tribe decision was
issued. See Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37,41 (1st Cir. 1997).
9. Only seven years before Seminole Tribe, the Court stated that Congress had the power to
abrogate sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers. See
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,14-15 (1989).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1994).
11. See Luder v. Endicott, 86 F. Supp. 2d 854, 866 (W.D. Wis. 2000); infra notes 33-57 and
accompanying text.
12 Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not erect a
barrier against suits to impose 'individual and personal liability' on state officials . . .") (quoting
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974).

FLSA and Qualified Immunity
when acting within the course of their official duties. 3 Qualified
immunity protects government officers from liability if their conduct
was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.' 4 If
qualified immunity were available to defendants facing FLSA claims,
state employees' ability to protect their FLSA rights would be considerably weakened."5 However, an examination of the basis for granting
government officials qualified immunity from civil rights claims leads
to the conclusion that this defense should not be available to bar an
FLSA action brought against state agents in their individual capacities.
Part I of this Comment outlines the substantive features of the FLSA
and examines the basis on which courts have imposed individual
liability for FLSA violations. The historical basis for granting state
employees limited immunity from suit when acting within the scope of
their official duties is developed in Part II. Parts I and IV explain the
two major recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding sovereign
immunity and their impact on the ability of state employees to protect
their rights under the FLSA. Part V analyzes why the FLSA should be
interpreted to provide a cause of action against state supervisory
personnel responsible for FLSA violations and proposes that the
common law defense of qualified immunity for governmental officials
has no application to such actions.
I.

THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

The FLSA establishes minimum standards for employment practices
within both the private and public sector. The FLSA establishes a cause
of action for aggrieved employees against their "employer," a term that
has a specific interpretation in the context of the FLSA.

13. Evan J. Mandery, Qualified Immunity or Absolute Impunity? The Moral Hazards of
Extending QualifiedImmunity to Lower-Level Public Officials, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 479,
483-85 (1994).
14. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
15. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
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The FLSA ProtectsState Employeesfrom Underpaymentfor
Overtime Hours Worked

Enacted in 1938, the FLSA 6 applies to all enterprises in the nation in
which interstate activities take place.' 7 A series of amendments from
1966 to 1985 extended FLSA coverage to states in their roles as
employers. 8 The FLSA establishes a federal minimum wage to be paid
to all employees 9 and requires that an overtime wage of time-and-a-half
apply for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per week.20 Specific
exemptions to the overtime requirement apply to certain classes of state
employees, 2' as well as to executive, administrative, and professional
employees.22 The FLSA imposes strict liability on any employer who
knowingly or unknowingly pays an employee less than the minimum
wage or fails to pay a non-exempt employee time-and-a-half for hours
worked beyond the statutory level.' The U.S. Supreme Court has
affirmed that the FLSA represents a valid exercise of Congress's
constitutional powers under the Commerce Clause,24 and that Congress

16. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1994)).
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1994).
18. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) (extending coverage to schools, hospitals, nursing
homes, and local transit systems, including those run by states); Fair Labor Standards Amendments
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.)
(expanding class of state employees brought within terms of Act). In 1976 the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that it was beyond Congress's constitutional authority to apply the FLSA to state employees.
See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 843 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985). After the Court overruled National League of
Cities in Garcia,Congress recognized certain special conditions applicable to various classes of
state employees. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 78791 (1985) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C) (1994)).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 206.
20. Id. § 207(a)(1).
21. Id. § 207(k), (o), (p) (providing exceptions for employees of public agencies engaged in fire
protection and law enforcement activities, and providing special rules for compensatory time in
lieu of overtime for certain public-sector employees).
22. Id. § 213(a)(1).
23. But see id. § 259 (providing one exception if employer has made "good faith ... reliance on
any administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation" of Wage and Hour
Division of Department of Labor).
24. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 188-99 (1968).

FLSA and Qualified Immunity
has the power to require that state employment practices conform to the
FLSA. z
Even though the FLSA permits the Department of Labor (DOL) to
pursue FLSA actions on behalf of employees, 26 Congress intended that
aggrieved parties have the power to pursue relief under the FLSA on
their own initiative.2 With regard to state employees, Congress has
noted that "[s]ince the 1974 Amendments extend FLSA coverage to
additional state government employees, it is now all the more necessary
that employees in this category be empowered themselves to pursue
vindication of their rights." Indeed, the United States' brief before the
U.S. Supreme Court in Alden v. Maine29 noted that "the Department of
Labor['s] ... recent experience confirms Congress's judgment that
private enforcement is necessary to ensure that state employees receive
the wages to which they are entitled by federal law."3' One commentator
has noted that the DOL has averaged less than fifty cases per year
brought under the FLSA since 1950." In contrast, between 1993 and
1997 alone, plaintiffs filed more than 61,000 civil FLSA actions in
federal courts.32
B.

The FLSA Contemplatesan Expansive Definition ofEmployer
Liability

The use of an expansive definition as to who may be held liable for
relief owed to employees arising from an FLSA violation supports the
broad remedial objectives of the FLSA.33 The FLSA states that "any

25. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457 (1997) ("In 1974 Congress extended FLSA
coverage to virtually all public-sector employees... and in 1985 we held that this exercise of
power was consistent with the Tenth Amendment.") (citations omitted).
26. 29 U.S.C § 216(c) ("The Secretary may bring an action... to recover the amount of unpaid
minimum wages or overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated damages .... Any
sums thus recovered... shall be paid.., directly to the employee or employees affected.").
27. See S. REP. No. 93-690, at 26-27 (1974) ("[Ihe enforcement capability of the Secretary of
Labor is not alone sufficient to provide redress in all or even a substantial portion of the situations
where compliance is not forthcoming voluntarily.").
28. Id at 27.
29. 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
30. Brief for United States at 37, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (No. 98-436).
31. See Gregg A. Rubenstein, The Eleventh Amendment, FederalEmployment Laws, andState
Employees: Rights Without Remedies?, 78 B.U. L. REv. 621,659 n.211 (1998).
32 Tina Kelley, When Overtime Doesn 't FeelSo Fine,N.Y. TIMFS, May 31, 1998, at B10.
33. See, e.g., Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999).
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employer who violates the... [FLSA] shall be liable to the employee or
employees affected in the amount of their... unpaid overtime compensation.., and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 34
An employer is defined as "includ[ing] any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and
'
includes a public agency."35
Courts have construed this definition
36
broadly, determining those with "managerial responsibilities" and

"substantial control of the terms and conditions of the [employee's]
work" may be employers for the purpose of establishing FLSA
7
3

liability.
1.

Involvement in the Activity GivingRise to the FLSA Violation
DeterminesLiability, Even Where No PersonalBenefit Accrues to
the IndividualLiablefor the Violation
The critical determinant of liability for an FLSA violation is

involvement in the activity that gives rise to the violation." The alleged
employer must have sufficient control over the employees' working
conditions to ensure compliance with the FLSA. 39 In Bonnette v.
California Health & Welfare Agency,40 the Ninth Circuit established a
four-part test that has been widely adopted to help evaluate whether an

individual or organization may be considered an employer within the
terms of the FLSA.4 Factors weighing in favor of a ruling that an

34. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994). Senator (later Justice) Hugo Black described this as "the broadest
definition that has ever been included in any one act.' United States v. Rossenwasser, 323 U.S.
360, 363 n.3 (1945) (quoting 81 Cong. Rec. 7657, July 27, 1937) (statement of Senator Black)).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
36. E.g., Dole v. Eliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1991) ('The remedial
purposes of the FLSA require the courts to define 'employer' more broadly than the term would be
interpreted in traditional common law applications.") (quoting McLaughlin v. Seafood Inc., 867
F.2d 875, 877 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)).
37. Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195 (1973).
38. See, e.g., House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 161 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (holding
individuals accountable due to their authority over employment decisions under ADEA, relying on
FLSA piecedents).
39. Brickley v. County of Smyth, 944 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (W.D. Va. 1996).
40. 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).
41. See id. at 1470 (applying four-factor test to determine that public welfare agencies were
employers of in-home service providers for blind and disabled). The Second Circuit adopted this
test in Herman v. RSR Security Services Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999). A number of
district courts have also adopted this test. See Robertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 78 F. Supp. 2d
1142, 1151 (D. Colo. 1999); Baker v. Stone County, 41 F. Supp. 2d 965, 979-80 (W.D. Mo. 1999);

FLSA and Qualified Immunity
individual has employer status include (1) the power to hire and fire, (2)

supervision and control of work schedules or conditions of employment,
(3) involvement in determining the rate and method of payment, and (4)
involvement in maintaining employment records.42 No one factor

standing alone is dispositive; rather courts look to the totality of the

circumstances.43 Further, not all factors must be present: the factors are
to be treated as merely a guide to an examination of the facts of each
case. 4
Whether the putative employer stands to benefit financially from the
underpayment of the employees is not a factor to be considered.45 For
example, within the private sector the courts distinguish ownership of an
enterprise from involvement in the activity.' Although there are many

cases imposing individual liability on substantial shareholders of closely
held corporations,47 a substantial ownership interest alone, without some
48

degree of control, is insufficient to justify liability for FLSA violations.
Significantly, courts have imposed individual liability against individuals with no ownership interest but with supervisory authority over
employees' working conditions.49
Barfield v. Madison County, 984 F. Supp. 491,497 (S.D. Miss. 1997); Brickley, 944 F. Supp. at
1315.
42 Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470.
43. See id
44. See RSR Sec. Servs., 172 F.3d at 140 (finding three of four factors sufficient).
45. Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195 (1973) (holding that partners in real-estate-management
partnership were employers of maintenance personnel despite employee's pay being determined
independently ofrmanagement fee going to partnership).
46. See Donovan v. Sabine Irrig. Co., 695 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that stock
ownership in corporate employer is not sine qua non of employer status under FLSA, and looking
to control of employment relationship to determine status as employer).
47. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Labor v. Cole Enters., Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1995)
(imposing liability on fifty percent shareholder and president).
48. Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 637-38 (1 Ith Cir. 1986) (deciding that principal stockholder
and president was not employer because he had no operational control of matters relating to
employees); Wirtz v. Pure Ice Co., 322 F.2d 259, 262-63 (8th Cir. 1963) (holding that seventy-five
percent shareholder who played no active role in company was not employer); see also House v.
Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 161 (M.D.N.C. 1988) ("A position as an officer or
shareholder is not a condition for liability, but merely an indicia of authority").
49. See, e.g., Schultz v. Falk, 439 F.2d 340, 344-45 (4th Cir. 1971) (holding that rental agents
were employers of maintenance personnel, despite lack of ownership interest in buildings
managed, and fact that agents were fully reimbursed by building owners for all wages paid to
personnel); Cannon Mills, 713 F. Supp. at 161 (relying on FLSA definition of employer to hold
two non-director, non-officer supervisors with no ownership interest liable as employers under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Brock v. VAFLA Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1516, 1520 (M.D. Fla.
1987) (finding that general manager of amusement park with no apparent ownership interest is
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Courts Have Imposed IndividualLiability on State Officials.

Cases imposing individual liability for FLSA violations within the
public sector are extremely rare. This partly reflects the more recent
coverage of state employees within the terms of the FLSA50 and partly
reflects that until the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions on
sovereign immunity,5 plaintiffs did not need to look to private parties
for relief when the state's resources were available to satisfy any
judgment. However, a number of district courts have declined to dismiss
claims against individual state officers who hold positions that give
them responsibility for the employment practices giving rise to the
alleged FLSA violations.52
Only three circuit courts have had the opportunity to consider whether
individual liability for FLSA violations applies to public officials. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed without comment an FLSA damage award
against the director of the Illinois Department of Central Management in
his individual capacity. 3 In Lee v. Coahoma County, 4 the Fifth Circuit
determined that a sheriff who had responsibilities for appointing
employer); Donovan v. Schoolhouse Four, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 185, 186, 190 (W.D. Va. 1983)
(holding that consultant to, and manager of, corporation are both employers when personally
involved in retaliatory firings despite no apparent ownership interest); Brennan v. Control Mfg.,
Inc., 22 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 212, 212-13 (D. Ariz. 1975) (holding that salaried president
with no ownership interest is employer when president supervised employees and set pay
practices).
50. See supra note 18.
51. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
52. Luder v. Endicott, 86 F. Supp. 2d 854, 866 (W.D. Wis. 2000) (declining to dismiss claim
against state correctional officers in their individual capacities); Mosley v. Douglas County Corr.
Ctr., no. 8-99CV78, 2000 WL 952681, *3 (D. Neb. May 17, 2000) (declining to dismiss
individual-capacity claim against state official under Family and Medical Leave Act, relying in part
on Endicott); Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 371 (D.N.J. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss
complaint against INS officials in their individual capacities for FLSA violations); Barfield v.
Madison County, 984 F. Supp. 491,499 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (holding sheriff liable in his individual
capacity for FLSA overtime violations suffered by sheriff's department employees); Marshall v.
Miller, 873 F. Supp 628, 632 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (declining to dismiss individual-capacity suits
against sheriff and other supervisors for development of record to allow application of "economic
reality" test); Bankston v. Illinois, No. 93-C-39, 1993 WL 141785, at *3 (N.D. I11.Apr. 30, 1993)
("It is not beyond the ken that... [the] director of the Department could qualify as a person acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of the Department."), afJ'd,60 F.3d 1249 (7th Cir. 1995).
53. Bankston v. Illinois, 60 F.3d 1249, 1257 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Riordan v. Kempiners, 831
F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that state employee could be considered "employer"
under FLSA "provided the [official] had supervisory authority over the complaining employee and
was responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation").
54. 937 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1991).

FLSA and Qualified Immunity
deputies and fixing their compensation fell "within the class of
managerial personnel considered employers by the FLSA" ' and hence
could be held jointly and severally liable for damages resulting from the
FLSA violation. 6 The Lee court relied on U.S. Supreme Court and Fifth
Circuit precedent determining the scope
of employer liability in the
7
private sector as support for its holding.
Contrary to the opinions of the Seventh and Fifth Circuits are two
Eleventh Circuit panel decisions denying that the definition of
"employer" used in the FLSA justifies holding individual state
employees liable for violations of statutes based on the FLSA 8 In
Welch v. Laney,"9 an Eleventh Circuit panel asserted, in a single

conclusory sentence supported by no authority, that the defendant
sheriff was an employer in his official capacity6 ' but not in his individual
capacity 2 for the purposes of the Equal Pay Act, a part of the FLSA 3 In
Wascura v. Carver,(' a subsequent Eleventh Circuit panel relied on

Welch in dismissing an individual-capacity claim against a state official
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)6 The FMLA
incorporates the FLSA definition as to who may be considered an
employer held liable for violations of the Act.' The Wascura court
stated that "we are bound by the Welch decision regardless of whether

55. Id. at 226.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 226 (citing Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 194 (1973) & Donovan v. Grim Hotel, 747
F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1984)).
58. Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 687 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (dismissing claims against various
public officials in their individual capacities); Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1011 (11th Cir.
1995) (dismissing individual-capacity claim against sheriff).
59. 57 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir. 1995).
60. Id. at 1011 ("Sheriff Laney in his individual capacity had no control over Welch's
employment and does not qualify as Welch's employer under the Act").
61. Id. at 1010.
62. Id.at 1011.
63. The 1963 Equal Pay Act is a part of the FLSA. It amended the FLSA minimum-wage
provisions to prohibit wage differentials based solely on sex. Pub. L. No.88-38, 77 Stat 56
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994)). The EPA relies on the same definition of employer as the
FLSA. Wascura, 169 F.3d at 686 (noting that EPA is extension of FLSA and incorporates FLSA's
definition of employer).
64. 169 F.3d 683 (1 Ith Cir. 1999).
65. Id
66. See id. at 686-87.
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we agree with it"f 7 and made no attempt to68 rebut the claim that the
Welch decision was "unclear and inadequate.,
Despite the split in the circuits, the definition of who may be held
liable as an employer under the FLSA is sufficiently broad to warrant
consideration of the doctrine of qualified immunity.
II.

THE DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY

The doctrine of qualified immunity presents a potential impediment
to FLSA individual-capacity suits against state officials. Qualified
immu-nity grants limited personal immunity to state employees when
sued in their individual capacities, 69 "shield[ing the official] from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known."" Qualified immunity is distinct
from sovereign immunity, which attaches to states or to state employees
sued in their official capacities.7 To determine whether qualified
immunity protects state officials from FLSA liability it is necessary to
understand the historical development and underlying policy rationales
for the granting of such immunities to government officials.72
A.

State Employees' Protectionfrom ConstitutionalTort Liabilities
Protects the Publicfrom the Consequences of Impairing Those
Officials in the Performanceof Their PublicDuties

Qualified immunity is a personal defense available to state employees
when sued in their individual capacities.73 Qualified immunity shields
public officials from pretrial procedural obligations74 and from personal
67. Id. at 687.
68. Id.
69. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21,25 (1991).
70. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)).
71. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 26-27 (stating that actions against state officials are not individualcapacity complaints simply because complained-of conduct was undertaken in course of their
official duties); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985) (noting that state's sovereign
immunity only restricts suits against public officials in their official capacities).
72. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 404 (1997) (explaining that history and policy
guide application of qualified immunity).
73. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25.
74. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996).

FLSA and Qualified Immunity
liability for money damages.75 Immunity for public servants has been
justified by the desire to prevent harm to the public that may result if
government officials are distracted from the effective performance of
their public duties by harassing lawsuits.76 The defense is designed to
protect public officials from undue interference with their duties,' to
prevent public officials from acting with an excess of caution,78 and to
ensure that talented candidates are not deterred from public service.79
The qualified immunity defense imposes an extraordinarily high
burden on plaintiffs seeking civil liability for public officials accused of
violating a plaintiff's constitutional rights. 80 Determining whether a
government official has violated a constitutional right generally requires
the application of a balancing test or a determination of whether the
official's acts were reasonable under the circumstances. 8' Courts'
willingness to grant qualified immunity in civil rights cases reflects the
difficulty of determining that an official knowingly violated a right
defined in such ephemeral terms. As Professor Pillard notes,
because of the common-law, case-by-case method through which
constitutional standards develop... and the high level of
specificity at which the clearly-established-law inquiry is conducted, most fact-intensive constitutional claims can reasonably be
characterized as new. A nonfrivolous defense based on the merits
of a constitutional
issue will generally suffice to support
82
immunity.

75. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

76. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 693-94 (1997).
77. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806.
78. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219,223 (1988).
79. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992).
80. Cornelia Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials'
Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. LJ. 65, 66 (1999) (reporting that in only four of

approximately 12,000 Bivens actions brought between 1971 and 1985 did plaintiffs obtain
judgments). See infra note 84 for an explanation of Bivens actions.
81. Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of

Facts in ConstitutionalTort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 1,45, 48 (1997) (noting that "balancing tests
have become the predominant mode of articulating substantive constitutional doctrine" and that
"the Court often invokes a substantive reasonableness standard as a metric for unconstitutional

behavior"); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643-44 (1987) ('Mhe precise content
of most of the Constitution's civil-liberties guarantees rests on assessment of what accommodation
between governmental need and individual freedom is reasonable.").
82. Pillard, supranote 80, at 79.
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Understanding the development of the doctrine of qualified immunity is
essential to determining the scope of its application.
B.

The HistoricalDevelopment of QualifiedImmunity Shapes the
Scope ofits Application
The U.S. Supreme Court developed the doctrine of qualified

immunity for public officials in response to the explosion in the number
of suits brought against state and federal officials83 following the Court's
expansion of liability for constitutional torts.84 In Monroe v. Pape,85 the
Court expanded the ability of plaintiffs to enforce constitutional rights
against state officials through damages actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6
Rejecting the argument that the "under color of law" clause reached only
unconstitutional acts taken by state officials when authorized by the
state, the Court held that § 1983 reached unconstitutional acts taken by
state officials even if they were acting without authority.8 7 The Court
thereby provided federal protection to private citizens "deprived of
88

constitutional rights.

. .

Having thus exposed
subsequently attempted
such actions through
calculated to counter
89
liability.

by [a state] official's abuse of his position.

state officials to civil liability, the Court
to limit the exposure of government officials to
the development of an immunity doctrine
Monroe's expansive statement of individual

83. Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that while there were only
twenty-one cases decided under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in its first fifty years, in 1988 alone more than
40,000 civil-rights actions were filed against government officials).
84. The term "constitutional torts" refers to damages actions brought against public officials in
their individual capacities for the deprivation of federal constitutional rights. See Berry v. Funk,
146 F.3d 1003, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1998). When brought against state officials, such actions are
authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Federal agents may be sued directly under the Constitution
as established by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics,403 U.S.
388, 397 (1971). Such suits have become known as Bivens actions.
85. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
86. Id. at 187 (holding that § 1983 provides cause of action against state officials). Section 1983
states: "[E]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects ... any citizen.., to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ...for
redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
87. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172.
88. Id.; see also id. at 194-98 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining need for federal remedy even
if unauthorized acts by state officials would constitute state tort).
89. Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983 s Asymmetry, 140 U.
PA. L. REv. 755, 774 (1992).

FLSA and Qualified Immunity
Although § 1983 contains no language granting immunity to
defendants, the Court developed an immunity doctrine to protect
officials from § 1983 claims. 90 The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed
the existence of immunity for government officials from constitutional
tort claims in Tenney v Brandhove.91 The Tenney Court granted
immunity to members of a committee of the California State Assembly
on Un-American Activities,' determining that the privilege of
legislative immunity was so deeply entrenched in the common law that
it was impossible to believe that Congress would have intended to
abrogate it in § 1983 without doing so explicitly. 93 Tenney granted the
legislators in question absolute immunity from suit, protecting them
from civil liability irrespective of fault or motive. Such "absolute
immunity" has a limited reach, only protecting officials when acting
within the scope of their legislative, judicial, or prosecutorial
capacities."
In contrast to absolute immunity, the Court has also recognized a
form of "good faith," or qualified immunity, a more limited form of
immunity available to a broader class of government officials than are
protected by Tenney's absolute immunity.9' Relying on Tenney's
assertion that common law immunities survived passage of § 1983,96 the
Court in Pierson v. Ray97 noted that the common law provided a goodfaith defense for police officers accused of false arrest98 and held that
this defense was also available to officers charged under § 1983. 99
Later U.S. Supreme Court decisions have extended the reach of the
qualified-immunity doctrine to include a broader class of government

90. Subsequently, § 1983 immunities have been applied in an identical manner to Bivens
actions. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
91. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
92. I- at 374-78.
93. See kl at 376.
94. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
95. See Mandery, supra note 13, at 487. Employment cases trigger only qualified immunity. Cf
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1988) (denying absolute immunity but remanding for
factual determination of whether judge accused of wrongful dismissal was entitled to qualified
immunity, because discharge was undertaken when acting in administrative capacity).
96. See id at 554-55.
97. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
98. Id. at 557.
99. Id.
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officials."° In Scheuer v. Rhodes,01t the Court expanded the class of
officials able to rely on qualified immunity beyond police officers,
noting that government officials with a broad range of duties face the
same need for swift, firm action as police officers. 2 Scheuer concerned
the liability of the Governor of Ohio for acts taken during the Kent State
University riots, a situation calling for rapid, intuitive judgments akin to
those undertaken by police officers in the course of their duties.' 3
Unable to cite any specific historical basis for qualified immunity for
officials in Sheuer's position,"° the Court instead relied on the need to
protect such officials from harassment." 5
Subsequently, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald"6 the Court abandoned the
subjective good-faith aspect of the qualified-immunity doctrine as
developed in Pierson and Scheuer 7 The Harlow Court adopted an
objective standard for evaluating a defendant's entitlement to qualified
immunity because of concerns that the subjective features of the goodfaith defense were failing to prevent insubstantial claims from
proceeding to trial, thus failing to free officers from time-consuming
court proceedings.' 0 8 As a result, qualified immunity protects "government officials performing discretionary functions... from 'liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct [does] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.'""0 9

100. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987) (noting that qualified immunity has
been expanded beyond its common law scope).
101.
102.
103.
104.

416 U.S. 232 (1974).
Id. at 246-47.
Id.
Id. at 248.

105. Id. at 239-49.
106. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
107. See id. at 815-16.
108. See id. at 818.
109. Wyatt v Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 166 (1992) (quoting Harlow,457 U.S. at 818).

FLSA and Qualified Immunity
III. SEMINOLE TRIBE AND ALDEN GRANT THE STATES
IMMUNITY FROM PRIVATE SUITS ALLEGING
VIOLATIONS OF THE FLSA
Two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have severely curtailed the
°
ability of state employees to protect their rights under the FLSA."
These controversial decisions' held that sovereign immunity shields the
states against private actions brought to enforce federal laws enacted
under Congress's Commerce Clause powers." 2 These decisions reversed
previous rulings as to the ability of state employees to sue states under
the FLSA. Prior to 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court had established that
Congress had the power to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from
suit when acting pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers as long as
Congress explicitly stated its intent to do so."13 In particular, the
Commerce Clause empowered Congress to specify that employee FLSA
rights may be 4enforced by private suit even if the defendant is a state or
state agency."
5
In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,"
reconsidered whether the Commerce Clause afforded Congress the
power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity" 6 from
suit in federal court." 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a fivejustice majority, announced that Article I of the Constitution did not
confer on Congress the power to expand the jurisdiction of the federal
courts over the states, overruling the Court's Union Gas decision of just
seven years earlier."

110. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Supra note 6.
111.
112- Alden, 527 U.S. at 754 (holding that Congress lacks power to subject states to private suit

in state court when legislating under its Commerce Clause powers); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47
(same result in federal court).
113. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
114. See, e.g., Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying Union Gas to
allow private FLSA action against state in federal court).
115. 517 U.S. 44(1996).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ('fte Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
117. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76.
118. See id. at 72-73.
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Following the Seminole Tribe decision, a number of FLSA suits
brought by state employees were dismissed from federal court on the
basis of the defendant state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. 19 Having
been denied access to the federal courts, many of the defeated plaintiffs
turned to state courts for protection of their rights. 20 The state courts
disagreed as to whether the states were immune from FLSA suits in their
own courts,' leading the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari to
resolve this question.' On June 23, 1999, the Court announced its
decision in Alden v. Maine.' Again by a five-to-four margin, the Court
announced that "the States retain immunity from private suit in their
own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by
Article I legislation."' 24 Without any plain constitutional language upon
which to base its extension of sovereign immunity to actions in state
court, the majority contended that "the scope of States' immunity from
suit is demarcated not by the text of the [Eleventh] Amendment alone
25
but by fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design.'
As a result of the Seminole and Alden decisions, state employees who
believe that their state's compensation practices violate the requirements
of the FLSA may not bring a private action against the state seeking an
award of back-pay or liquidated damages in either state or federal court.
The Alden court rejected the argument that its decision to bar private
actions against states would effectively confer on a state the right to
disregard valid federal law. 26 The Court identified six avenues of
judicial review that are available to enforce the states' obligation to obey
validly implemented federal law in light of a series of limits implicit in
the constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity. 27

119. See, e.g., Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37,48 (lst Cir. 1997) (deciding that FLSA was enacted
pursuant to Congress's Commerce Clause powers and therefore granting sovereign immunity to
State of Maine on basis of Seminole Tribe).
120. See, e.g., Alden v Maine, 715 A.2d 172, 173 (Me. 1998).
121. Compareid. (holding suit barred from state court), with Jacoby v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 962
S.W.2d 773, 778 (Ark. 1998) (determining that Eleventh Amendment does not protect states from
suit for violations of FLSA in state court).
122. Alden v. Maine, 525 U.S. 981 (1998).
123. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
124. Id. at 754.
125. Id. at 729.
126. Id. at 754-55.
127. Id. at 755-57.

FLSA and Qualified Immunity
First, states may consent to suit." Second, in ratifying the
Constitution, the states consented to suits brought by the federal government. 29 Third, Congress may abrogate sovereign immunity when acting
30 Fourth, sovereign
pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment powers.
immunity does not extend to lesser entities such as 'municipal corporation[s] or other government entit[ies] which are not an arm of the
state."'' Fifth, the Exparte Young' 32 doctrine permits individuals to seek
an injunction against officers of the state to perform a duty which they
have neglected or refused to perform, so long as the relief sought is
merely prospective injunctive or declaratory relief.3 Finally, the Court
suggested that an action for damages may be brought against state
officers in their individual capacities.' 34
IV. PERSONAL-CAPACITY SUITS PROVIDE THE ONLY
AVENUE FOR STATE EMPLOYEES TO PROTECT THEIR
FLSA RIGHTS
If state employees wish to pursue claims for back wages on their own
behalf, the only cause of action available (absent waiver by the state) is
an individual-capacity suit against a state officer based on that official's
status as an employer. None of the other enforcement mechanisms
suggested by the Alden Court provide a means for state employees to
protect their rights under the FLSA on their own behalf, as envisioned
by Congress. The Alden Court suggested that individual-capacity suits
may be an available option to enforce some statutory rights, relying on36
Scheuer v. Rhodes'35 and FordMotor Co. v. Department of Treasury
as support for the availability of this cause of action. 137 However, neither
Scheuer nor Ford provides a basis for concluding that this option is
available under the FLSA.

128. Id. at 755.
129. Id. at 755-56.
130. Id. at 756.

131. Id.
132. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
133. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 757.
134. See id.
135. 416 U.S. 232,237-38 (1974).
136. 323 U.S. 459,462 (1945).
137. Alden, 527 U.S. at 757.
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Excepting the Use of Individual-CapacitySuits, the Alden Court's
ProposedEnforcement OptionsFail To Provide State Employees
with an EnforceableCause ofAction Under the FLSA.

The first five enforcement options suggested by the Alden Court are
either inapplicable to the FLSA or fail to provide state employees with
the ability to seek financial compensation on their own behalf as
envisioned by the FLSA. First, the states' history of antipathy to the
FLSA138 suggests that few state employees will be able to rely on their
states' voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity. Indeed, in the short
period of time since the Seminole Tribe decision, twenty-two states and
Puerto Rico have invoked immunity in FLSA and related actions.139 As a
political question, state employees may be able to lobby for legislative
action to waive reliance on sovereign immunity by their state; however,
courts are bound by the political decision of the states as to this matter.
Second, reliance on DOL representation is likely to be unavailing due to
a lack of resources and is clearly contrary to Congress's intent for
private enforcement of the FLSA. 40 Third, no court has accepted an
argument that the FLSA represents an exercise of Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment powers. 14' Fourth, the opportunity to bring suit against a
lesser entity is of no value to any state employee who does not work for
such a lesser entity. Finally, the Exparte Young doctrine is inapplicable
only the
to actions to enforce the FLSA because the FLSA permits
42
Secretary of Labor to bring actions for injunctive relief.

138. See Joanne Brant, Seminole Tribe, Flores and State Employees: Reflections on a New
Relationship,2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 175, 208-12 (1998) (providing brief history).
139. See Aaron v. Kansas, 115 F.3d 813, 818 (10th Cir. 1997) (relying on cases dismissing
FLSA claims against states from federal court after Seminole Tribe in Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and Virginia);
see also Powell v. Florida, 132 F.3d 677, 678 (11 th Cir. 1998); Jackson v. Kentucky, No. 95-6238,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 32763 (6th Cir. Nov. 12, 1997); Balgowan v. New Jersey, 115 F.3d 214 (3d
Cir. 1997); Castro v. Puerto Rico, 43 F. Supp. 2d 186 (D.P.R., 1999); Larry v. Univ. of Ala., 975 F.
Supp. 1447, 1450 (N.D. Ala. 1997); Amdt v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 972 F. Supp. 475 (W.D. Wis.
1996); Goebel v. Colorado, No. 93-K-1227, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20929 (D. Colo. June 25,
1996) (decided on other grounds); Whittington v. N.M. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 966 P.2d 188, 189
(N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (denying immunity): Butterfield v. State, 987 P.2d 569 (Or. Ct. App. 1999);
Lawson v. Univ. of Tenn., No. E1999-02516-COA-9-CV, 2000 WL 116312 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan.
28, 2000).
140. Supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g, Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 44-49 (1st Cir. 1997).
142. See 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1994); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978)
(holding that FLSA precludes employee's access to injunctive relief).

FLSA and Qualified Immunity
B.

Alden ProvidesNo Guidance as to Whether Individual-Capacity
Suits Provide an EnforcementMechanism Applicable to State
Employee FLSA Rights

Because neither Scheuer nor Ford concerned suits brought under the
FLSA, the Alden Court's reliance on these decisions provides no
guidance as to whether the FLSA provides a cause of action against
individual state officials. Furthermore, the Court's reliance on Scheuer
raises, but does not answer, the question as to whether a state official
accused of responsibility for an FLSA violation is entitled to the shield
of qualified immunity.
The passage from Ford relied on by the Alden Court is dictum
because no individual-capacity action was at issue. The Ford Court
43
determined that Ford had a cause of action against the state.' The
specific passage in Ford relied on by the Alden Court refers to two cases
concerning the recovery of unconstitutional taxes from a state tax
collector.' 4 However, at the time of those decisions "taxes were
collected by a revenue officer whose relation to the state was closer 'to
45
that of an independent contractor than to that of an employee.'
Furthermore, personal-capacity actions against state tax collectors could
only proceed if the collector had not yet turned the wrongfully withheld
taxes over to the state." Since no individual state official will ever
personally hold the funds wrongfully withheld because of underpayment
of a state employee's wages, no analogous liability can exist for an
FLSA violation.
The Alden Court's reliance on Scheuer v. Rhodes 147 provides no
guidance either, because the cause of action in Scheuer was provided by
§ 1983, which establishes a cause of action against state employees in
their individual capacities for constitutional violations. 48 While § 1983
provides a cause of action for constitutional torts, it does not provide the
basis for a cause of action against a state official accused of violating the
143. See Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459,462-63 (1945).
144. See Ford,323 U.S. at 462 (citing Atcheson, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 223
U.S. 280 (1912) & Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932)).
145. Carlos Manuel Vkzluez, What isEleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE LU. 1683,

1774 (1997).
146. See Michael Lepp, Action Against Collector, 72 AM. JuR. 2D State And Local Taxation
§ 1113 (1974).

147. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
148. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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FLSA.' 49 Furthermore, the primary issue in Scheuer was whether the
parties in question could invoke either absolute or qualified immunity
from suit. 50 If anything, this case identifies the difficulties of bringing
an individual-capacity suit against a state employee, rather than
suggesting that this is a viable cause of action.
V.

THE FLSA PROVIDES A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
RESPONSIBLE STATE AGENTS AND DOES NOT PERMIT
THOSE AGENTS TO INVOKE A QUALIFIED-IMMUNITY
DEFENSE

If state employees are unable to prosecute supervisory personnel for
FLSA violations, their ability to protect their FLSA rights will be
severely compromised. 5 ' In order to preserve a cause of action for state
employees to bring individual-capacity suits against appropriate state
supervisory personnel, state employee defendants in FLSA actions
should not be entitled to rely on a qualified-immunity defense. Qualified
immunity should not shield state officials from liability under the FLSA
because there is no basis for applying the qualified-immunity doctrine to
FLSA actions based on either accepted principles of statutory
construction or on the basis of the common law underpinnings of the
doctrine.
A.

The History and Language of the FLSA ContemplateIndividual
Liabilityfor Supervisory State Officers Involved in the Activity
Giving Rise to the FLSA Violation

Permitting state employees to sue state agents in their individual
capacities is consistent with the policy of holding a broad class of people
liable for FLSA violations if they are involved in the decisions leading
to a violation.'52 The history of the FLSA indicates that Congress's
intent was to attach individual liability to government employees in the

149. See Barfield v. Madison County, 984 F. Supp. 491,509 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (determining that
FLSA violation cannot form basis of § 1983 claim because FLSA contains its own complete
remedial scheme).
150. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247-48.
15 1. See supranotes 138-42 and accompanying text.
152. See supranotes 35-39 and accompanying text.

FLSA and Qualified Immunity
3
same way that the statute had been applied to corporate employees."
When Congress wishes to treat government employees accused of

statutory violations differently from corporate employees, it is free to do

so. " As noted by a widely cited155 district court opinion, 5 6 Congress

had explicitly stated its intent to limit those who could be sued in federal
employment discrimination cases in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) two years
before the 1974 FLSA amendments. 5 7 Congress was aware of how to
indicate that it wished government defendants to be treated differently
from private-party defendants and yet chose not to do so in the FLSA.
government
This omission suggests that Congress intended that
58
FLSA1
the
under
individuals
as
sued
be
could
employees

Furthermore, Congress has on a number of occasions recognized that
special rules may be required when applying the FLSA to states as
employers.5 9 Yet Congress chose to adopt existing definitions as to who

may be held liable for FLSA violations when expanding protection to
state employees.' 60 Congress must be presumed to have been aware of
the courts' expansive interpretation as to who could be held liable as an
employer under the FLSA.' Therefore, the decision to adopt the same
definition of "employer" when extending protection to state employees

153. See H. REP. No. 93-913, at 28 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2837 ("It is
the intent of the committee that... the provisions of the law [be applied to public employees] in
such a manner as to assure consistency with the... application... to other sectors of the
economy.').
154. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 207(k), (o), & (p) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 541.5d (1999) (Special
Provisions Applicable to Employees of Public Agencies).
155 See, e.g., Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 371 (D.N.J. 1998); Marshall v. Miller, 873 F.
Supp. 628, 632 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Bankston v. Illinois, No. 93-C39, 1993 WL 141785, *3 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 30, 1993).
156. Weiss v. Marsh, 543 F. Supp. 1115, 1121 (M.D. Ala. 1981).
157. See id.
158. Cf. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
176-77 (1994) ("Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do
so.... [Therefore] [i]f... Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, we presume it
would have used the words 'aid' and 'abet' in the statutory text"); In re Haas, 48 F.3d 1153, 115657 (1 1th Cir. 1995) ("Where Congress knows how to say something but chooses not to, its silence
is controlling... [even if in different statutes] because Congress is presumed to be aware of
pertinent, existing law when it passes legislation.).
159. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(k), (o), & (p); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.5d.
160. See 29 U.S.C. §203.
161. See United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 628 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Under accepted rules of
statutory construction, it is generally presumed that Congress, in drafting legislation, is aware of
well-established judicial construction of... existing statutes.").
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implies that Congress envisioned the same expansive exposure to
62
liability in the public sector. 1
In summary, based on the history and the language of the FLSA,
individual state officers who are responsible for violative employment
conditions may be held liable as employers within the terms of the
FLSA.
B.

There Is No Basis in the Statute or Common Law for Granting
State Officers a QualifiedImmunity for Violations of the FLSA

The U.S. Supreme Court has provided extensive guidance as to how
the qualified-immunity doctrine is to be applied to a particular statute:
§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.163 However, whether other statutes
should be interpreted to admit this defense is a question that the lower
courts have addressed without guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court."6
Lower courts have, for the most part, blindly assumed that the doctrine
65
is available to a state official accused of violating any federal statute.
162. The courts have consistently taken this view with regard to other extensions of the FLSA.
For example the Equal Pay Act (EPA) was enacted as an amendment to the FLSA in 1963. Equal
Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§206(d)). The EPA
incorporates unchanged the definition of "employer" from § 203(d) of the FLSA. The courts have
universally relied on FLSA precedent to determine interpretation of "employer" status under the
EPA. See, e.g., Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1011 (1 th Cir. 1995) (relying on Wirtz v. Lone Star
Steel Co., 405 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1968), which was decided under FLSA, to guide interpretation as
to who may be employer under EPA); cf Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457 (1997) (noting that
salary-basis test used to determine exemptions from FLSA overtime requirement was adopted in
1940 before coverage of public-sector employees, but applying test identically to public-sector
employees to determine exemptions from Act.); Bryant v. Delbar Prods., 18 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807
(M.D. Tenn. 1998) (noting near identity of language of FMLA and FLSA definitions of employer
to adopt interpretations of employer status from FLSA into FMLA).
163. See supra notes 69-79, 97-108 and accompanying text.
164. Every U.S. Supreme Court decision on qualified immunity has involved either a claim
under § 1983 or a Bivens action. The Court recently declined to grant certiorari to consider the
application of qualified immunity to the Federal Wiretap Act. See Petition For Writ of Certiorari at
i, Blake v. Wright (99-848) (stating question presented as "[s]hould the common law qualifiedimmunity defense afforded to public officials in claims based upon constitutional rights be
extended to claims arising from violations of statutory rights?"), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 980
(2000).
165. See Gary Gildin, Dis-QualifiedImmunity for DiscriminationAgainst the Disabled, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REv. 897, 900 (1999) ("In short, the courts adjudicating damage claims under the
Rehabilitation Act, [American with Disabilities Act, and Individuals with Disabilities in Education
Act] have blindly cloned the § 1983 qualified immunity defense without considering whether the
defense is consonant with Congress's intent.'); see also Baker v. Stone County, 41 F. Supp. 2d
965, 1003 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (relying on fact that "no Defendant has intentionally acted to violate
Plaintiffs' rights" to grant qualified immunity to various officials in their individual capacities). But

FLSA and Qualified Immunity
This ignores the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court "look[s] to both the
history and to the purposes that underlie government employee
immunity"'" to determine the reach of the qualified-immunity doctrine.
To respect both Congress's intent with regard to the interpretation of a
federal statute and the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to qualified
immunity, courts should conduct a preliminary inquiry as to whether the

grant of qualified immunity is appropriate for the statute at issue.' 67
Applying qualified immunity to the FLSA is inconsistent with both
Congress's intent and with the common law basis for the doctrine.
1.

There Is No Basisfor GrantingQualifiedImmunity to Defendants
in an FLSA Action Based on the Language orHistory ofthe Statute
The courts should not apply personal-immunity defenses developed in

the context of constitutional torts to federal statutes without consider-

ation of the language of the statute and congressional intent. 6 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted that because
both § 1983 and Bivens actions were essentially Court-created actions, it
was within the U.S. Supreme Court's discretion to apply common law
immunities to these common law torts.'69 However, when the statute at
issue provides its own limited defenses, there is no scope for the courts
70
to "graft common law defenses on top of those that Congress creates."'
see Barfield v. Madison County, 984 F. Supp. 491, 496 n.8 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (rejecting
defendant's claim to qualified immunity from FLSA claim since defendant failed to cite any cases
recognizing qualified immunity as defense to claim for violation of FLSA).
166. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399,404 (1997); see also Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158,
167-68 (1992) (declining to extend qualified immunity to private persons who conspired with state
officials to violate constitutional rights, because "the nexus between private parties and the historic
purposes of qualified immunity is simply too attenuated to justify such an extension of our doctrine
of immunity"); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920-33 (1984) (declining to extend qualified
immunity to public defenders because no such immunity existed at common law).
167. See Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that
qualified-immunity doctrine applies to federal wiretap statute); Samuel v. Holmes, 138 F.3d 173,
178 (5th Cir. 1998) (relying on language and purpose of Federal Claims Act to reject application of
qualified immunity).
168. See, e.g., Berry, 146 F.3d at 1013; McClelland v. McGrath, 31 F. Supp. 2d 616, 619 (N.D.
III. 1998).
169. See Berry, 146 F.3d at 1013; see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611-12 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We find ourselves engaged... [in] crafting a sensible scheme of qualified
immunities for the statute we have invented-rather than.., the statute that Congress wrote.");
Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 89, at 759 ("As it stands today, § 1983 is almost entirely a judicial
construct").
170. Berry, 146 F.3dat 1013.
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The FLSA contains both a cause of action'71 and its own enumerated
defenses. Congress has included in the FLSA a grant of immunity to
actors who act in "good faith... reliance on any administrative order,
2
ruling, approval, or interpretation" of an administrative agency.1
Furthermore, defendants may avoid an award of liquidated damages by
establishing that they acted in good faith and on the basis of a reasonable
belief that they were not violating the FLSA.173 It is inappropriate for the
courts to import common law doctrines to expand those defenses that
Congress, within the terms of a statute, has provided to the cause of
74
action it has created.
Furthermore, in no congressional record of the various amendments
to the FLSA extending coverage to state employees in 1966, 1974, and
1985 is there any mention that Congress wished state employers to be
able to rely on any special defense not granted to private-sector
employees. 75 Instead, the legislative history suggests that it was
Congress's intent to grant state employees the identical protection
available to private sector employees.'7 6
It is also significant that Congress has recognized the special needs of
state employers in delimiting certain exceptions to the terms of the
FLSA when applied to public sector employees,'77 yet no such special
treatment is accorded to state officers liable in their individual capacities
under the FLSA. Furthermore, Congress has, when it so desired,
specified statutory defenses available to state employees not available to
private-sector individuals. 7 8 The absence of such language in the FLSA
should, therefore, be determinative of Congress's intent.

171. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994) ("An action to recover the liability prescribed... may be
maintained against any employer ... by any one or more employees ...
172. Id. § 259.
173. See id. § 260.
174. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164 (1992) ("Irrespective of the common law support, we
will not recognize an immunity available at common law if § 1983's history or purpose counsel
against applying it in § 1983 actions.").
175. This arguably reflects the presumption at the time that state employees would be able to
enforce their rights directly against the states.
176. See supra note 153.
177. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(k), (o), & (p).
178. See 40 U.S.C. § 489(a) (1994) (specifying that "no officer or employee of the government
shall be... liable'); 16 U.S.C. § 831c-2(a)(1) (1994) (providing that no action shall be brought
against individual employees of Tennessee Valley Authority); 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-525 (1994)
(providing, inter alia, temporary immunity against military personnel during course of active duty).

FLSA and Qualified Immunity
2.

There Is No Common Law Basisfor GrantingQualifiedImmunity
to Defendants in FLSA Actions

Even if a court were to decide that established common law defenses
to tort claims against government officials survive passage of the FLSA,
unless Congress explicitly rules otherwise,179 there is no common law
basis for the existence of immunity for a public official accused of
violating the FLSA. In evaluating the reach of qualified immunity the
U.S. Supreme Court looks to whether there is a specific historical
application of immunity granted to the type of official in question.3 ° In
addition, the Court considers whether the need to protect public officials
from suit is of sufficient gravity to outweigh the rights of plaintiffs to
have their rights protected.' Neither test supports allowing a qualifiedimmunity defense to an FLSA suit.
There is no historical basis for qualified immunity for state
employees who violate the FLSA. In looking to the historical basis for
the common law defense, a court must consider what common law
defenses were available at the time of the passage of the FLSA.1 2 The
first extension of the FLSA to cover a limited number of state employees
was enacted in 1966.' Because this predates both Pierson and Scheuer,
none of the qualified-immunity defenses subsequently established under
§ 1983 were available at the time of the passage of the 1966
amendments."8 4 Although the Pierson precedent has, over time, been
extensively broadened to give a variety of administrative personnel
protection for employment-related decisions," 5 these extensions have
not been based on any pre-1966 historical precedent. Numerous
commentators have noted that qualified immunity is no longer grounded
179. See Blake v. Wright, 179 F.3d 1003, 1012 (6th Cir. 1998) (relying on fact that federal
Wiretap Act does not indicate that public officials cannot claim qualified immunity rather than

looking to defenses that statute does include).
180. See supra note 163.

181. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
182. See supra note 163. Justices Scalia and Rehnquist have criticized the Court's grant of
immunity from q 1983 actions on the basis of doctrines developed after the passage of the Civil
Rights Act. See, e.g., Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 505 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 66 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
183. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830 (1966).

While later amendments broadened the class of state employees covered by the FLSA, see supra
note 18, the first time Congress acted to extend protection to government employees was in 1966.

184. See Wade, 461 U.S. at 66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
185. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
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in its historical roots,1 86 so that it is inconceivable that Congress, in
1966, could have anticipated the establishment of such a broad-based
defense by subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
There is no persuasive policy argument for granting a special defense
to state officers responsible for FLSA violations. In establishing the
parameters of the qualified-immunity defense, the U.S. Supreme Court
has balanced the interests of those who have been injured by official
misconduct against the harm to the public that may result if government
officials are distracted from the effective performance of their public
duties by harassing lawsuits. 187 The Court has identified two distinct
threats from which it wishes to protect public employees. One is the
threat to their time that would result from being forced to contest
actions.18 The second is the financial threat that may deter those
officials from carrying out their duties "with the decisiveness and the
judgment required by the public good"'8 9 and that may also act to
discourage qualified workers from seeking employment in the public
sector.190
There is far less need to protect state officers from the risk of timeconsuming court actions resulting from insubstantial FLSA claims than
is the case for constitutional tort claims. The contrast between the legal
standard required for constitutional violations and for violations of the
FLSA is of great relevance in establishing the need for such protection.
Determining whether a constitutional right has been violated frequently
requires a court either to determine whether an official's conduct was
reasonable under the circumstances or to balance competing interests.191
As a result, potentially harassing accusations of constitutional violations
are likely to proceed to time-consuming court actions due to the
186. See David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the U.S. Supreme Court:
JudicialActivism and the Restriction of ConstitutionalRights, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 23, 38 (1989)
("[T]he Court rejected the limits of common law [regarding immunity] and, invoking
considerations of public policy, substituted its own policy judgments for the commands
of... § 1983."); Stephen Shapiro, Public Officials' Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Actions
Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald and Its Progeny:A CriticalAnalysis, 22 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 249, 268
(1989) (noting that reformulated qualified-immunity standard is "not a minor adjustment to some
arcane rule of the common law ...[but] a complete departure from the whole concept of common
law good faith immunity").
187. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992).
188. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
189. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
190. See Harlow,457 U.S. at 814.
191. See supranote 81 and accompanying text.
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difficulty of evaluating such standards in pre-trial procedures. The strict
liability nature of FLSA violations 9 2 leads to a far greater likelihood that
harassing accusations can be dealt with prior to the commencement of
time-consuming litigation. The need for a qualified-immunity defense
designed to act as a gatekeeper allowing "a procedural mechanism for
disposing of... cases at the earliest possible stage of litigation... through summary judgment"'9 3 is absent when the cause of
action itself may be disposed of in this way. Hence, in weighing the need
to protect state officers from harassment, the threat of insubstantial
claims proceeding to the point of presenting a distraction from those
employees' abilities to undertake their public duties is greatly reduced."9
The need for protection of state employees from time-consuming,
insubstantial lawsuits is also less significant because the circumstances
of an FLSA violation differ from those accompanying constitutional
violations. Unlike the broad language of the Constitution, the FLSA
represents a carefully drafted statute with an extensive history of
interpretation by the courts and by the DOL. 95 The long history of
application of the FLSA to private-sector employers has ensured that
many of the potential ambiguities of the law have been clarified. If an
application of the FLSA is in doubt, employment administrators may
request clarification from the DOL as to how the FLSA applies to
specific factual situations.'9 6 Further, an experienced administrative
officer establishing a state's employment practices is not subject to the
stressful need to make on-the-spot decisions akin to those of the
Governor of Ohio facing student riots in Scheuer'9 or the police officers
or prison officials who are the most common targets of § 1983 and

192. See supranote 23 and accompanying text.
193. Chen, supranote 81, at 21.
194. Further, the fear of harassment by particularly litigious individuals is not as significant
when the plaintiffs in FLSA actions will themselves be government employees, not members of the

public with an ax to grind against the government. See Crawford-el v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 575
n.l (1998) (referring to problems of "litigious prisoners" and "legal troublemakers").
195. The DOL has the responsibility to promulgate rules interpreting and implementing the Act.

29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1994).
196. For example, Freeman Wood, the official responsible for setting the Maine probation
officers' pay and employment practices, specifically stated that he had seen DOL opinion letters

relating to the issue of pay for probation officers, yet chose not to determine how these applied to
the Maine probation officers. See Mills v. Maine, 853 F. Supp. 551, 554-55 (D. Me. 1994) affid
118 F.3d 37,41 (Ist Cir. 1997).
197. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
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Bivens actions. 98 The circumstances that have led the courts to give
deference to government officials operating in such stressful
environments do not apply to state administrative officials responsible
for establishing a state's employment practices. 99 The courts'
willingness to accept that when making spur-of-the-moment decisions in
stressful situations a state officer may not know the fine details of
judicial interpretation of constitutional rights has no relevance to
administrative officers who are responsible for violations of the FLSA.
Furthermore, the threat to a state employee's pocketbook is overstated
in the FLSA context. The widespread existence of state reimbursement
statutes" greatly alleviates the financial threat to state employees from

individual-capacity suits.201 Even absent such relief from financial

penalty, the need for protection of state officials from suit depends on
whether the fear of being sued will "dampen the ardor... [of public
2 2 so as to
officials] ... in the unflinching discharge of their duties""
cause harm to the public. Absent the potential for harm to the public
there is no reason for providing protection to such an official.2" 3 A law
enforcement officer's timidity in stopping, interrogating, or searching a
suspected criminal may result in less effective crime prevention, and
ultimately in harm to the public. However, as to a public official
operating in an administrative capacity determining the pay practices of
state employees, the only likely effect of greater timidity is to cause
198. See Arthur Wallberg, More Than a Defense: Absolute and Qualified Immunities of State
Officials Under 42 US.C§1983, 69 FLA. BJ. 108, 109 (1995) (noting that due to sheer number of
adversarial contacts with citizenry, police are likely most common target of § 1983 actions); see
also Scheuer v. Rhodes 416 U.S. 232, 244-45 (1974) (noting that police officers are "that segment
of the executive branch... that is most frequently and intimately involved in day-to-day contacts
with the citizenry, and hence, most frequently exposed to situations which can give rise to claims
under § 1983").
199. See A. Allise Burris, Comment, Qualifying Immunity in Section 1983 & Bivens Actions, 71
TEX. L. REV. 123, 175 (1992) ("The fearlessness and independence required of judges, cited in
Pierson and early common law immunity decisions, do not justify the breadth of protection that has
ensued.").
200. See Vdzquez, supra note 145, at 1796 n.464 (listing forty-five states with reimbursement
statutes).
201. Statutory reimbursement of state employees for liabilities incurred when performing
official duties does not imply that a suit against that individual becomes an official-capacity suit
potentially subject to sovereign immunity. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ability to Sue State
Governments Narrowed, TRIAL, Dec. 1999, at 72, 74 (citing cases from Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits).
202. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,
581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
203. See supra notes 76, 187, and accompanying text.
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greater care in ensuring compliance with the law. Congress has provided
a defense to employers who rely in good faith on an administrative
ruling by the DOL." Therefore, timid state administrators can protect
them-selves against the threat of financial liability arising from their
decisions by requesting a ruling on any doubtful application of the FLSA
from the DOL. As a result, at worst, a threat to a state officer's
pocketbook will result in that officer taking a more considered approach
to determining pay policies and a possible increase in the number of
inquiries fielded by the DOL. This burden to the public does not
outweigh the rights of plaintiffs in an FLSA action.
Finally, the fear that the threat of liability may discourage qualified
people from seeking public sector employment 20 5 is irrelevant in the
context of the FLSA. Because only public officials may be the target of
constitutional tort claims, 206 an individual considering public-sector
employment can avoid exposure to constitutional torts by taking a
position in the private sector. In contrast, a personnel officer cannot
avoid the threat of an individual-capacity FLSA claim by working in the
private sector.20 7 Hence, this concern provides no justification for
providing special protection to public sector employees.
In summary, the threat to effective government that concerned the
U.S. Supreme Court when developing the qualified-immunity doctrine
in the context of constitutional torts is largely absent from FLSA causes
of action. Hence, in balancing the interests. in plaintiffs' abilities to
protect their FLSA rights against the threat to the public from exposing
government officials to liability for FLSA violations, the balance favors
allowing state employees to protect their FLSA rights unburdened by
any additional defenses beyond those enumerated in the FLSA itself.

204. See 29 U.S.C. § 259 (1994) (providing defense for employer who has in "good

faith... reli[ed] on any administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation" of
wage and Hour Division of DOL).
205. See Harlow,457 U.S. at 814.
206. See Joseph D. McCann, The Interrelationshipof Immunity and the Prima Facie Case in
Section 1983 and Bivens Actions, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 117, 117-18 (1985) (noting that § 1983

actions provide remedies against state or municipal officials and that Bivens provides remedies
against federal officials, but private parties can be liable only for conspiring with such officials).
207. See supra note 46-49 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent reinterpretation of the
reach of state sovereign immunity, state employees are prevented from
seeking restitution for wages wrongfully withheld due to having been
paid in violation of the FLSA. For these employees to be able to protect
their own rights as intended by Congress, the only form of relief
available is for the wronged state employees to bring an individualcapacity suit against state agents responsible for establishing the
violative pay practices. Individual-capacity suits against appropriate
state agents can provide an effective means for state employees to
protect their rights, ensuring that the fate that befell John Alden and his
fellow probation officers need not be suffered by other state employees.
However, the courts must recognize that qualified immunity is an
inappropriate doctrine to apply to protect individual state officers from
liability for FLSA violations if state employees are to be afforded an
opportunity to defend their rights as Congress intended.

